DigitalCommons@NYLS
Articles & Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

Winter 1987

Social Change and Tort Litigation: Industrialization, Accidents,
and Trial Courts in Southern West Virginia, 1872-1940
Frank W. Munger

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters

Social Change and Tort Litigation:
Industrialization, Accidents, and Trial Courts in
Southern West Virginia, 1872 to 1940
FRANK W. MUNGER*

I.

E

INTRODUCTION

of the role which courts have played in nineteenth
century American industrialization have often been preoccupied
with the content and impact of the opinions of appellate judges. The decisions of appellate courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
reflect interesting, much debated issues such as the relationship of legal
evolution to economic expansion,' the interests of a capitalist class, 2 contemporary views of social justice,3 and the legal profession's own modes
of reasoning.4 It is equally true that the majority of cases are never heard
by appellate courts. Appellate courts can only address the issues in cases
that are appealed. Therefore, a mere recounting of appellate opinions is
neither reflective of the volume of trial court litigation, nor representative
VALUATIONS
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of the substance of the cases brought to court. Moreover, evaluations
based on appellate decisions have produced little knowledge concerning

the influence of appellate courts on either the intellectual life of trial
courts or on the outcomes of cases decided by trial courts. Most impor-

tantly, neither appellate nor trial courts, by themselves, provide answers
to questions about why litigation occurred, or what significance litigation

held as a form of conflict or conflict resolution.
Courts undoubtedly play an important role in conflict and conflict
resolution. An understanding of their role requires an understanding of

how litigation arose from the activities and social relationships which
make up the life of a community.' Therefore, a better understanding of
the role of courts in industrialization requires looking beyond appellate

opinions to the actual litigation which provided the occasion for the legal
opinions. The search cannot end there, however. It requires an examination of the circumstances and events that gave rise to the litigation, and a
determination of how these factors affected the lives of the actors in-

volved in the litigation.
This Article describes tort litigation in three southern West Virginia
counties at the turn of the century. 6 It represents an attempt to explore
the functions7 of litigation in resolving conflicts arising from personal
injury or property damage which occurred during America's nineteenth

century industrialization. This Article is also an experiment in the methodology of examining trial court records. It attempts to bring to life the

complex process by which courts become involved in change and conflict. The methodology employed examines both the narrow range of in5. Many of the questions which I have attempted to answer in this Article were inspired by the
work of James Willard Hurst on law and social change. J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN: 1836-1915 (1964). I have used
Hurst's careful examination of social process and legal history as a starting point, and often as a
source of hypotheses in need of testing and revision. For example, this Article reflects on Hurst's
assumption that law is responsive to the social needs of a community. This hypothesis is subsumed
by Hurst's premise that law is effective because it is legitimate. The relationship between the rational
content of law and the actual uses made of legal institutions by community members is a link often
overlooked both in Hurst's own work and in the research tradition it has inspired in the sociology of
law. For related criticisms see Genovese, Law and the Economy in CapitalistAmerica: Questionsfor
Mr. Hurston the Occasion of his CurtiLectures, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 113; Harring & Strutt,
Lumber, Law and Social Change: The Legal Historyof Willard Hurst, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
123.
6. The three counties are Fayette, Raleigh, and Summers.
7. By function I mean the importance of litigation in maintaining, or helping to change, social
relationships outside the legal system. For further discussion of the concept of function see Munger,
Law, Changeand Litigation:A CriticalExaminationofAn EmpiricalResearch Tradition, 22 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. (1988) (in press).
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formation available in trial court records, and also the broader
information about litigants and their continuing relationships available in
historical and archival sources. 8
II.

TORT LITIGATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND

EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY TRIAL COURTS

A.

The Case of Annie Jones

In 1899 a fire broke out in a row house in Fayetteville, West Virginia, the county seat of Fayette County. 9 In anticipation of the spreading fire, Annie Jones, a row house tenant living two doors from the fire,
dragged her personal belongings to safety. In an effort to preserve the
other houses in the row, Mr. Middleburg, Jones's landlord, detonated a
charge of dynamite in the row house located between his row house and
the burning structure. As a result of the explosion, burning debris fell
among Annie Jones's personal possessions and destroyed them.
The range of typical responses of a victim of this misfortune may
have included private appeals to Middleburg, friends, relatives, or other
tenants, or merely accepting one's fate in silence. Perhaps Annie Jones
actually attempted a private appeal for compensation or assistance. History has not left us with any indication of her extralegal attempts at a
remedy. However, historical studies of litigation demonstrate that by
1899 America was already a litigious society.1" Perhaps motivated by a
lack of a private remedy, or influenced by societal trends to litigate, or
8. The deficiency in utilizing only the limited information available in court records to describe
complex procedures of conflict resolution was suggested by criticism of longitudinal research. Krislov, TheoreticalPerspectiveson Case Load Studies: 4 Critique anda Beginning, in EMPIRICAL THEORiEs ABoUT COURTS (K. Boyum & L. Mather eds. 1983) [hereinafter EMPIRICAL THEORIEs]. For
details concerning the research design and the sampling technique see infra note 22.
9. The account of the fire and the litigation which followed is taken from the case file in the
proceeding brought before the Fayette County Circuit Court in 1899. File reference number 2756.
This case was selected from a sample of tort cases. Civil docket books no longer exist for the circuit
courts studied in this research. Cases are listed in alphabetical order in a composite index compiled
by the court clerks after the loss of the original docket books. The file reference number is the means
by which the alphabetical listing and the case file are cross-referenced.
10. Studies of litigation include Blankenburg, Legal Insurance,Litigant Decisions, and the Rising Caseloadsof Courts:A West German Study, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 601 (1981-82); Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A StatisticalAnalysis of FederalDistrictCourts in the Twentieth Century, 55
S. CAL. L. REv. 65 (1981-82); Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patternsof Case Handling:A Case
Study of Two Rural Counties, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 381 (1985); Friedman, Courts Over Time: A
Survey of Theories and Research, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES, supranote 8, at 9; Friedman & Percival,
A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'y REv. 267
(1975-76); McIntosh, Private Use of a Public Forum:A Long-Range View of the Dispute Processing
Role of Courts, 77 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 991 (1983).
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both, Annie Jones elected to take her case to the Fayette County Circuit
Court," the state court of general jurisdiction for all matters involving

more than $25. She prayed for $300 in damages resulting from the negligence1 2 of Middleburg in placing and detonating the dynamite. Annie

Jones was represented by the firm of Dillon and Nuckolls. The defendant
Middleburg was represented by the firm of St. Clair, Walker and Summerfield. Both were respected Fayetteville law firms, and both firms han-

dled a variety of issues and litigants. There was little apparent
specialization among the members of the bar who handled tort suits for
litigants such as Annie Jones.1 3 There were few outsiders in the circuit
court practice of southern West Virginia, unless they came from Charles-

ton. 14 The case went to trial before a jury, which rejected Annie Jones's
characterization of Middleburg's conduct as negligent, and returned a
verdict for the defendant. There was no appeal. The circumstances of
Annie Jones's case illustrate one way in which the growing density and
complexity of community life might increase the likelihood of civil
disputes. 15
B.

Community Change and Tort Litigation, 1870-1925
Fayetteville was a town in which the nineteenth century industrial
11.

See supra note 9.
12. The law of negligence is particularly suited to redress for damages arising from any of the
thousands of daily acts which occur between people living in close proximity. Indeed, one theory of
the development of the law of negligence is that it represents a late nineteenth-century response to
the increasing number of civil wrongs occurring between strangers. There are several well-known
statements of this idea including W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 161-90 (2d ed.
1972); SCHUR, LAW AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW 121-22 (1968); see generally Selznick,
The Sociology of Law, 9 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCI. 50, 57 (1968).
13. The trend toward specialization among lawyers handling tort litigation is discussed in Section III(F), infra.
14. In 1908, there were 14 attorneys whose practices were located in Hinton, the seat of Summers County. J. MILLER, HISTORY OF SUMMERS COUNTY 235 (1908). By 1920, 32 attorneys were
listed as having a post office address in Beckley, the seat of Raleigh County. WEST VIRGINIA HANDBOOK AND MANUAL AND OFFICIAL REGISTER (J. Harris ed. 1920). While no comparable figures are
available for Fayette County, attorney biographies in the leading county history suggest that a core
of 12 to 15 attorneys had their practices in Fayetteville in 1900. J. PETERS & H. CARDEN, HISTORY
OF FAYETTE COUNTY 361-62 (1926).
15. Other ways in which the increasing density and complexity of community life increased the
likelihood of civil disputes included, for example, the increasing use of dangerous industrial technology. As machines became more powerful and workers increasingly interdependent (so that a mistake
-by one worker using a machine was more likely to hurt another nearby worker) the number and
severity of injuries increased. Mechanization of transportation introduced similar risks for travelers
as well as for transportation employees. Increasing population density, by itself, led to new risks
which included both the risk of property damage (as in Annie Jones's case) and risks to life and
health. See C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA 206 (3d ed. 1983).
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and technological transformation of American community life was occurring. This transformation was marked by a rapid increase in population. By 1900, Fayette County had 32,000 residents, an increase of 480%
over 1870.16 Fayetteville was no longer the small town it had been a few
decades before. Perhaps more significantly, the rise in population resulted from migration from other parts of the county, from other parts of
West Virginia, from other southern states, and from an aggressive campaign by the State Department of Labor to encourage immigration of
laborers from southern and southeastern Europe. 17 Fayetteville's growth
under the impact of West Virginia's industrialization was typical of
southern West Virginia towns, and probably resembled the growth 8of
many other industrializing communities throughout North America.1
The growth of Fayetteville typified the effect of the rapid industrialization on rural southern West Virginia. 19 The building of the Chesapeake
and Ohio Railroad between 1869 and 1873 opened the region to commercial coal production. Mining quickly became the region's principal industry and its link to the rest of the country. In addition, the changing scale
and changing activities of community life in Fayetteville were driven by
forces generated in the growing national economy. The rapidity of the
national and local change, the immense technical and organizational
problems of a new industry, and the conflict between new and old community ways increased both the number of transactions between relative
strangers in the community, and also the subsequent likelihood of increased tortious injuries to property and persons.20
As suggested above, the mere frequency of opportunity for tort liti16. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, CENSUS REPORTS:
TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1 CENSUS BULLETIN, No. 53, POPULATION OF WEST
VIRGINIA BY COUNTIES AND MINOR CIVIL DIVISIONS 2 (1901).
17. D. CORBIN, LIFE, WORK AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN WEST
VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880-1922, at 8 (1981).
18. For a description of demographic changes in the late nineteenth century and their impact on
rural and urban life see C. GLAAB & A. BROWN, supra note 15, at 134-51. For an interpretation of
the effect of the resulting social change on small town life, see R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER,
1877-1920 (1967).
19. R. ELLER, MINERS, MILLHANDS, AND MOUNTAINEERS: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE
APPALACHIAN SOUTH, 1880-1930, at 49-52 (1982); J. WILLIAMS, WEST VIRGINIA AND THE CAPTAINS OF INDUSTRY 165 (1976).
20. Rapid growth in southern West Virginia expanded the lumber industry to a significant commercial enterprise, initiated railroad construction, and triggered the explosive growth of the mining
industry. Each of these new activities involved the risk of bodily injury on a scale not before experienced in the region. Increased conflict of other kinds also accompanied industrialization, including
numerous property title disputes, conflict between the labor force and owners, and the kind of commercial conflict which arises when deals are made and broken in an unpredictable economy. See D.
CORBIN, supra note 17. See generally Williams, The New Dominion and the Old: Ante-Bellum and

80

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

gation does not in itself adequately explain the reasons for such litigation.
In order to understand the function of tort litigation in late nineteenth
and early twentieth century America, it is necessary to examine what
actually happened in trial courts. While Annie Jones's case provides an
example of what might be supposed to be a growing number of accidental
injuries arising out of the greater density and complexity of social existence, it must be asked whether her case was in fact typical of actual
litigated cases, and whether it fully reflected the function which tort law
played in this growing American community. It must be asked whether
tort litigation was used more frequently as communities grew, and if so,
was the increase relative to the size of the community at each stage of its
growth. It should also be investigated whether all types of tort cases increased in number as communities grew, or whether certain types of tort
cases were more frequent than others.
In order to address these questions, the research presented in this
Article employed longitudinal analysis of litigation trends. Longitudinal
studies of trial-court caseloads can help answer questions about the
changing role of litigation in the life of a community.2" The research was
based on information taken from the order books and case files of three
West Virginia state circuit courts between 1872 and 1940.22 Examining
StatehoodPoliticsAs the Background of West Virginia's "Bourbon Democracy," 33 W. VA. HIST.317
(1972).
21. Longitudinal litigation research has typically involved an examination of the records of
cases fied in a single jurisdiction over a significant period of time. The number of cases, the kinds of
cases, who instituted and who defended the litigation, trends and the changing outcomes are recorded. See supra note 10. However, reliance on quantitative measures of these changes, without
attempting to explore the intricacies of consequences and conflict, invites interpretation of trends as
the outcome of a constant process in a changing external environment. In fact, however, the process
of litigation is constituted by the actions of individuals who are not constants in the midst of change.
Consequently, as I will demonstrate in this Article, it is not clear that quantities of litigation can be
accurately compared from one time period to the next.
22. The analysis included information from state circuit and county court order books of Fayette, Raleigh, and Summers counties for the years 1872-1925, 1930, and 1940. The circuit courts
were trial courts of general jurisdiction handling both civil and criminal matters. They also heard
appeals from matters tried before justices of the peace. All matters before the court were included in
the study provided they were not merely related to court administration, such as paying court officials, or nonadversarial administrative duties, such as granting various types of licenses. Information
about more than 36,000 cases was read, coded, and analyzed by computer.
Concerns existed regarding drawing inferences from changes in the quantity of litigation alone.
See supra note 21. However, these concerns were addressed by means of the research design, in
which statistical data derived from the circuit court records were supplemented by other types of
information. The study included a statistical analysis of the cases filed in the three state circuit
courts. It also included examination of the case files in a random one third sample of tort cases filed
in the circuit court in Fayette County. The sample yielded detailed information about litigation. See
infra notes 65, 77, 79, & 96 and accompanying text. The examination of case files also provided
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the changing numbers and types of cases in the state trial courts will
begin to reveal how such changes affected the use of the courts to resolve
conflicts arising from injuries to persons and property.
Tort litigation constituted only a small portion of the caseload of the
circuit courts during the period of this study. While the percentage of
tort cases rose from 3.1% between 1872 and 1875 to 6.2% between 1891
and 1895, it declined immediately to 3.9% and did not rise above the
1891-1895 peak until after 1930. Contract and property cases each consistently comprised a greater percentage of the total caseload than did
tort cases. Though the percentage of tort cases remained small, the actual
number of tort cases increased over time as the size of the communities
increased. However, neither the percentage of tort cases, nor the increase
in the number of tort cases, tells us whether tort cases were brought more
frequently as communities grew in size and as industrialization changed
the nature of the activities taking place in the communities. If it is true
that larger, more industrialized communities rely more on litigation to
resolve conflict than do smaller less industrialized ones, then litigation
rates in these three West Virginia counties will have increased over the
period of their growth. 3 Examining the number of cases per 10,000 inhabitants of the counties reveals whether litigation was more or less frequent at one period of the community's growth (size) than at another.
The litigation rates per 10,000 persons which are displayed in Figure 1
show that tort, contract, and property litigation were affected differently
by social change. Both contract and property litigation rates decreased
during the periods of economic growth between 1870 and 1885 (during
the takeoff in Fayette County), between 1905 and 1915 (during the
growth in Raleigh County), and in the immediate post-war period. Tort
information about particular cases, the litigants, and their attorneys. See supra note 9; infra note 30.
For a parallel study of cases appearing in federal district courts during the same time period, see
Munger, CommercialLitigation in West Virginia State and Federal Courts, 1870-1940, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 322 (1986).
23. As a community grows, one would expect more tort cases because there are more people,
and consequently more accidents. Depending on the nature of the activities in the community, the
number of tort cases may increase faster than other kinds of cases. Consequently, the percentage of
tort cases in the caseload of local courts may also increase. However, such increases do not necessarily mean that the courts are becoming more popular or useful. They only indicate that there are
more accidents and that the number of accidents is probably increasing faster than other kinds of
disputes. Even though the absolute number of cases fluctuates greatly, the rate of cases may be quite
constant relative to the number of people in the community, or to the number of accidents. The
number of cases relative to the population, or to the number of accidents, is called the litigation rate.
For an excellent and influential discussion of the difference between the percentage of caseload and

the rate of litigation see Lempert, More Tales of Two Courts: Exploring Changes in the "Dispute
Settlement Function" of Trial Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv. 91 (1978-79).
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Figure1

State Circuit Court Cases (per 10,000 population)
inThree West Virginia Counties
1872-1925 (Five year averages), 1930 and 1940

1870

1880

1890

1900

19081910 1913

1920

1930

1940

1908 Federal Employers' Liability Act Passed by Congress
1913 Workers Compensation Act Passed by West Virginia Legislature

litigation maintained a relatively constant rate with the exceptions of a
sharp decline in both the late 1890s and during World War I, when all
forms of litigation declined. It should be noted, however, that the appearance of relative stability in the tort litigation rate in Figure 1 is due in
part to the effects of scale, since the number of tort cases was so much
smaller than those of property and contract. This fact may be understood
more clearly by examining Figure 2 in which tort litigation per 10,000
persons is plotted on a much finer scale.
Why did tort litigation rates display this particular trend? The answer lies in determining which changes taking place in these counties
contributed to an increase or decrease in the use of courts as a means of
resolving conflicts over compensation for injury to persons or property. 24
24. In addition to the changing relations between court and community, variables in the internal
organization of the courts could also have affected patterns of litigation. These variables include the
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Figure 2

Tort Cases inThree West Virginia
State Circuit Courts (per 10,000 population)
1872-1925 (Five year averages), 1930 and 1940
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19081910 1913
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1908 Federal Employers' Liability Act Passed by Congress
1913 Workers Compensation Act Passed by West Virginia Legislature

To begin with, social change affected particular kinds of relationships

among actors in the communities in different ways. For example, relationships between employers and employees, between merchant retailers

and consumers, and between neighbors were affected in different ways by
such factors as industrialization, the growth of a national market, and

increases in population." The types of conflicts arising from each relalocation of the court, the number of judges, court costs, jurisdictional amount or other jurisdictional
boundaries, and factors affecting court delay. However, with the exception of court delays, which I
do not examine in this Article, these factors did not change during the time periods examined in this
study. Consequently, their progressive effect on tort litigation rates cannot be accurately determined
from the data examined in this Article.
25. Industrialization and the growth of a national market are changes in social organization.
The organization of work was affected most dramatically by these factors. More subtle changes
included the development of techniques of marketing over large geographic regions, and the extension of increasing amounts of credit to both merchants and consumers. Growth of the native population increased the density of many communities, but migration and immigration, resulting from
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tionship and what was done to resolve them were also likely to be different. Therefore, it is logical to examine the rate of litigation of conflict
arising from each type of relationship separately.
Figure 3 presents the rates of tort litigation initiated by individual

Figure 3
Tort Cases inThree West Virginia
State Circuit Courts (per 10,000 population)
1872-1925 (Five year averages), 1930 and 1940
*u==" Railroad Defendants
ooooo Coal Company Defendants
Individual Defendants

1870

1880

1890

1900

1908191011

1920

1908 Federal Employers' Liability Act Passed by Congress
1913 Workers Compensation Act Passed by West Virginia Legislature

plaintiffs against three types of defendants: individuals, railroads, and
coal companies. The rate of litigation of tort cases (per 10,000 population) brought by individuals against other individuals shows a relatively
steady decline until approximately 1920, -coinciding with the advent of
the automobile to West Virginia. The decline is unbroken until nearly
1920, with the exception of a brief fluctuation in the rate during the depression years of the 1890s. Annie Jones's case occurred during this flucintense labor recruitment, had an even greater effect on population growth. These factors combined
to change the meaning of city, community, and neighborhood. See S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO
INDUSTRIALISM: 1885-1914 (1957); R. WIEBE, supra note 18.
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tuation.26 Beginning about 1920, the tort litigation rate for suits brought

by individuals against individuals increased steadily until another decline
occurred near 1930.27
The organizations sued by individuals in tort suits were mainly coal

companies and railroads, and the rates of litigation against these two
types of companies are plotted separately in Figure 3. Relative to the size
of the population, tort litigation against both types of companies rose

from the late 1870s until the depression of the 1890s, plausibly reflecting
the effects of railroad construction and the expansion of mining into Fayette County. As Figure 1 illustrates, the depression of the 1890s reduced
the rate of contract and property litigation, as well as tort litigation, perhaps because the costs of litigation remained fixed, while the resources of
litigants were temporarily reduced. The decline was not unique to indus-

trial accident litigation rates, which is demonstrated by a similar decline
in all three litigation rates in the mid 1890s. The overall decline in litiga-

tion reveals the strong effects of a national depression on the process by
which potential litigants in southern West Virginia selected alternative
methods of resolving otherwise litigious conflicts. After the turn of the

century, as Raleigh County developed with the construction of railroads
and an increase in coal production, the rate of tort litigation against both

types of companies rose again until about 1910. After 1910 both litigation rates declined relative to the size of the population.

A workmen's compensation statute was enacted by the West Virginia legislature in 1913,28 but the decline in the rate in tort litigation
against coal companies began well before this date. The Federal Employ-

ers' Liability Act, passed by Congress in 1908, eliminated some commonlaw defenses used by railroads in defending tort litigation brought by
their employees.2 9 Instead of rising, however, the rate of tort litigation
26. The precise reasons for the apparent rise in tort litigation at the beginning of the depression
are not clear. However, one possible contributing factor was that hard times were the occasion for
more frequent trespasses on neighbors' lands.
27. Since I have data only for the years 1872-1925, 1930, and 1940, I cannot tell when the
decline between 1930 and 1940 began.
28. W. VA. CODE §§ 1-56 (1913).
29. Federal Employers' Liability Act (Railroads) of 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)). The Act made important modifications in the common law
as applied to employers within the reach of the Act, among them railroads. Congress took care not
to shift the burden of litigating cases under the Act to the federal district courts. The Act barred
removal of covered cases to federal district court. The Supreme Court made clear in its construction
of the Act that most litigation was expected to take place in state courts. The case load of the federal
district court for the Southern District of West Virginia confirms that there was no surge of tort
cases in the federal court when the Act was passed. Many tort cases were removed to federal court,
of course, but on appropriate grounds, such as diversity of citizenship.
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against railroads declined in the three counties following the passage of
this Act. Employee accident litigation against both coal companies and
railroads, therefore, must have been influenced by other factors which
reduced the litigation rate. It is not known whether railroads and coal
companies made special efforts to keep cases out of courts, or whether
the number of accidents experienced by railroad employees, passengers,
or miners actually declined. Any one, or any combination, of these factors could have produced a declining rate of tort litigation against both
coal companies and railroads after 1910.
In sum, first, there was no overall rise in the rate of tort litigation as
a result of the growth and industrialization in these three counties. As
Figure 2 demonstrates, while the numbers of cases climbed, the number
relative to the increase in population displayed no overall trend of increase. Second, the rate of tort litigation arising from different social relationships followed very different patterns. During the early decades of
regional industrialization, tort cases between individuals declined relative
to population until automobiles came into common use, while tort cases
brought against industrial employers rose in rough proportion to the increasing activity in each industry. In the long run, however, while tort
litigation between individuals rose, tort litigation against industries declined, the latter evidently at least partly the result of legislative changes.
While some fluctuations in litigation rates can be plausibly explained as
the result of a pattern of social change-such as the effects of the national
depression of the 1890s, the effects of World War I, or the effects of the
growing use of the automobile in West Virginia-others cannot be explained so easily. The greater hazards of industrial employment, the increasing density of population, and the risks of injury arising from the
actions of others did not have a simple and direct effect on either the
number of tort cases, or on their rate relative to the size of the population. For this reason, however, because they did not follow a pattern
which may have appeared plausible, they raise interesting questions
which may not have been otherwise asked.
III.

A.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND TORT LITIGATION

The Case of HarrisonFox

Annie Jones's suit against her landlord was not typical of the bulk of
the tort cases filed in the state circuit court. This Article could have begun with another, more typical, type of case. A law suit brought in 1908
by the administrator of Harrison Fox's estate was more representative of
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the largest class of cases. 3° Fox died while working in the Sunbeury Coal
and Coke Company's "Sunnyside" mine. Fox was represented by Simms
and Hamilton, a Charleston law firm, one of many which "rode the circuit" in the region east and south of the state capital. 31 The case was one
which evoked sympathy. Fox's job was to move coal cars from inside the
mine to the foot of the main entrance, using only a mule to pull the cars.
At the main entrance the cars were hauled to the tipple on the surface by
an electrically powered motor. Electricity was a frequent source of coal
dust ignition, and consequently a well-known hazard in the mines. However, that was not the problem on this occasion. Electrical wires had been
allowed to dangle in a large puddle near the spot where Fox attached the
cars to the machinery which hauled them to the surface. Stepping in the
water on his way to the main entrance, Fox died instantly. The plaintiff
prayed for $10,000 in damages.
A jury trial was held, at which Sunbeury was represented by Dillon
and Nuckolls, the firm which represented Annie Jones. Although Dillon
had represented plaintiffs in accident litigation against coal companies in
the past, he had done so in an earlier phase of his law practice, before
forming the partnership with Nuckolls.32 The attorney with whom he
practiced before 1899, C. W. Osenton, became the leading plaintiff's attorney in Fayette County after their partnership dissolved, while Dillon's
later involvement in such cases was as a defense attorney.
Testimony for the plaintiff tended to show that the wires were
placed negligently and fastened improperly. At the conclusion of the testimony, Dillon moved to have stricken from the record all of the testimony for the plaintiff. The basis for the defendant's motion was the
common-law doctrine known as the fellow servant rule, which held an
employer blameless for negligence attributable to another employee.33
30. The facts which appear in this narrative are taken from the file in the case brought by Fox's
administrator in the Fayette County Circuit Court in 1908. File reference number 2065. See supra
notes 9 & 22.
31. W. MCCORKLE, RECOLLECTIONS OF FiFry YEARS OF WEST VIRGINIA at xi-xii (1928).
32. Dillon's practice with Nuckolls is described as "one of the ablest and best known law firms
in Southern West Virginia." BENCH AND BAR OF WFST VIRGINIA 290 (G. Atkinson ed, 1919).

Examination of the case files of the Fayette County Circuit Court between 1880 and 1910 revealed
that Dillon had been in law practice with a number of other attorneys at different times.

33. The fellow servant doctrine stated that an employee injured through the negligence of another employee of the same employer could not hold the employer liable for the fellow servant's

negligence. Although over time the doctrine accumulated many qualifications and exceptions (such
as the qualification that an employer had a nondelegable duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe
workplace), the rule created a difficult barrier to recovery by employees. Some jurisdictions recognized the fellow servant doctrine or the doctrine of assumption of risk, but not both. However, West
Virginia accepted both doctrines. See infra note 34.
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Finding the fellow servant rule applicable, the court granted the defendant's motion and directed the jury to find in favor of the defendant.
B.

Community Change and IndustrialAccident Litigation

In order to understand the significance of the Fox case, the frequency with which miners, or their next of kin, sought compensation
through litigation must be examined. It should be determined if the outcome of the Fox case was typical of contemporaneous litigation. In addressing these issues, Figure 3 illustrates two relevant concerns suggested
by the rising litigation rates against railroads and coal companies between 1900 and 1910. First, it is plausible to suggest that nineteenth century common-law barriers to recovery, such as the fellow servant rule,
should have discouraged litigation.34 If the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals maintained the fellow servant rule until 1913, when a workmen's compensation statute was enacted by the state legislature, then the
rates of litigation against both coal companies and railroads, and the Fox
case in particular, present a paradox. The apparent failure of appellate
court hostility to lower the rate of industrial accident litigation in the
state circuit courts until well into the twentieth century suggests that
other factors offset the advantages that common-law rules gave employers. Those factors might have included the sympathy of judges or juries
at the trial court level, increasing encouragement from lawyers, a change
in the nature of accidents, and encouragement for litigation from family,
peers, or the community at large.
Second, if the hypothesis of a rising litigation rate is confirmed, the
result would add a significant dimension to the emerging picture of the
factors which contributed to the adoption of workmen's compensation
and mine safety legislation in the progressive era. Historians of progressive era regulatory reform have argued that industrial accident litigation
had an effect on the adoption of both types of legislation. Mainstream
and revisionist historians disagree about the motives for adoption. The
34. In addition to the common-law fellow servant rule, the doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence also barred employer liability for employee injuries. Whenever an employee
reasonably should have known the risks entailed by employment, and in theory bargained for a wage
which would make the risks acceptable, assumption of risk barred that employee's recovery. When-

ever the employee's own negligence contributed to any degree to the cause of the injury, contributory
negligence barred employee recovery. Virtually every industrializing state accepted some, and usu-

ally all, of these rules, making recovery from employers for injury extremely difficult under the
common law. For contrasting views of the general effects of these rules see Friedman & Ladinsky,
Social Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. Rv. 50 (1967); and Schwartz,
supra note 2.
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former claim that the changes reflected a growing consensus about social

insurance as a fair and rational accommodation of the social welfare of
both businesses and workers. The latter claim that businesses accepted
and promoted progressive era regulation as a means of controlling both
the destructive effects of competition and the threat of class conflict. 5
Mainstream theory assumes a continuing inability of injured workers to
recover just compensation through litigation. 36 Revisionist theory assumes that litigation was at least sufficiently effective to motivate industrialists to seek self-interested reform.37 While one historian of mine
safety legislation has stated that the motives of coal operators who supported adoption of these laws are "obscure," the logic of the revisionist
argument may make sense for the coal industry.38 The existence of large
35. Mainstream arguments are made in Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 34, at 65-69; and in
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1771. Both articles argue that the fellow servant rule and similar doctrines
were changed by legislation to fit both a growing sense among business leaders that the system
developed under the common law was impractical, and the view among workers' advocates that it
was unfair. Workmen's compensation legislation represented a rational, problem solving response to
the ineffectiveness of the common law. It reflected a growing belief that responsibility for industrial
accidents should be shifted to employers. Revisionist views emphasize the self-interest of the business
community in the adoption of social welfare legislation. See G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); R. LuBovE, THE
STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECuRrrY, 1900-1935 (1968) (business concerns over financial losses); J.
WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918 (1968) (business concerns
over class conflict); Hays, The PoliticsofReform in Municipal Government in the ProgressiveEra, 55
PAC. Nw. Q. 157 (1964) (business concerns over inefficiencies of the traditional system of regulation). Weinstein, Big Business and the Originsof Workmen's Compensation, 8 LAB. HisT, 156 (1967).
These authors argue generally that social welfare legislation was adopted when, and because, business leaders saw it in their interest to do so. For a useful review of these revisionist positions, arguing
against each one of them in turn, see W. GRAEBNER, COAL MINING SAFETY IN THE PROGRESSIVE
PERIOD 135-55 (1976).

36. Mainstream theorists make much of the accumulation of exceptions to the fellow servant
rule. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supranote 34, at 59-65. Implicit in this theory is an assumption that
the growing complexity of the law directly led to an uncertainty of outcomes at the trial court level.
This, however, is an unexamined assumption. Mainstream interpretations of the adoption of workmen's compensation frequently cite evidence showing that trial courts were considerably more lenient than appellate courts in applying the fellow servant rule. However, lenience is quite different
from inconsistency due to confusion about doctrine. Further, sufficient lenience, whether due to
sympathy or due to doctrinal confusion, might allow great certainty in the outcome. Neither of these
problems is dealt with by the mainstream scholarship. See also infra note 40.
37. R. LUBOVE, supra note 35, at 50-52; Weinstein, supra note 35, at 160-67. The specific focus
of the self-interest varies with the account. Litigation plays a different role in motivating each facet
of business self-interest in support of social legislation. The financial incentives for social insurance
would be clearest if litigation of industrial accident liability was costly. Conversely, if litigation were
cheap and routine, no such motivation could be inferred. If unions made lack of compensation an
issue, pointing to litigation under the common law, then litigation might play an indirect role in
maintaining yet another motive for social legislation, namely class conflict. Of course, litigation and
the courts may have been only tangential to the process by which the statutory law was changed.
38.

W. GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 149.
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numbers of small coal operators made it difficult to avoid the destructive
effects of competition on safety standards, and thus increased the risk of
accident liability. 9 A rising rate of litigation of industrial accident claims
may have provided one motive for the adoption of workmen's compensation. However, these arguments are still quite speculative. We need to
know much more about the rate and costs of industrial accident litigation

in order to understand its impact on operators' motivations in supporting
changes in the law.4'

IV.

MEASUREMENT OF THE RATE OF INDUSTRIAL

ACCIDENT LITIGATION
In examining the rates of tort cases, it may be observed that the
number of cases fluctuates more rapidly than the size of the population,
due to factors which sometimes may be plausibly inferred from the circumstances under which the changes occurred. However, the use of population as a basis for evaluation of industrial accident litigation does not
help determine whether litigation fluctuates relative to the risk of acci39. Id. at 1-10.
40. General conclusions about the relationship between self-interest and litigation are often
based on broad, nonspecific information. For example, seldom do theorists suggest that the docket in
one or two state trial courts considered only over a brief span of years may not be representative of
litigators' motives. For example, one article cited studies of trial court accident litigation in Wisconsin as if the results were likely to be representative of the patterns in other jurisdictions. Friedman &
Ladinsky, supra note 34, at 58 n.29, 61. However, the general representativeness of the Wisconsin
trial courts are questionable due to two factors discernible in the article. First, the studies themselves
were not described in sufficient detail to allow the reader to judge their representativeness even to
other Wisconsin trial courts. Second, throughout the article the authors acknowledged the exceptionally liberal decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. However, this court's early position on
the fellow servant rule was unique, and its caseload, which included more than seventy percent of
industrial accident cases near the end of the nineteenth century, did not resemble that of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Consequently, if the trends between the state courts of Wisconsin and West Virginia are not consonant, there is little reason to suspect that the trends in litigation
of Wisconsin trial courts are reflective of West Virginia or any other state.
Similarly, another commentator examined trial court outcomes of cases appearing in a single Los
Angeles county court for the years 1889 to 1895. Schwartz, supranote 34, at 1760. The commentator
selected only accident cases brought against railroads. It is not clear whether accidents to passengers
and accidents to employees were distinguished. Even if they were, the results do not appear to warrant a general conclusion about patterns of industrial accident compensation.
Another commentator's excellent history of the adoption of workmen's compensation laws in the
United States relied exclusively on the contemporary studies of the inadequacy of the existing system
of compensation under the common law. See R. LUBOVE, supra note 35. While these studies demonstrated a lack of adequate compensation under the common law, they did not address the specific
questions raised by later historians, concerning the predictability of outcome, or the burden to particular classes of employers. Furthermore, Lubove's history introduced yet another variable not examined by other discussions of workmen's compensation, namely the insurability of the risk. Id. at
51-52.
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dents, because population is not proportionate to risk.4" Consequently,
by using a base for the tort litigation rate which more accurately reflects
the risk of tort injury, the effects of intervening factors that contribute to

the use of courts for dispute resolution may become more readily discernible. The plausible tie between the risk of injury in coal mining and the

amount of coal produced suggests that the risk of accidents might be
better represented by production than by population.4 2

Figure 4 provides a comparison of two measures of the rate of tort
litigation against coal companies. One is based on population and the
other is based on coal production. The two measures yield quite different

impressions of the trends in litigation rates. The wide variation in the
population-based measure may be contrasted with the relatively steady

production-based measure. Except for the astronomical (and misleading)
litigation rate produced by the low coal production figures between 1870

and 1875, the rate of litigation per million tons of coal mined remained
relatively steady until World War I. This steady rate strongly suggests
that injuries and the resulting litigation were relatively predictable byproducts for miners and coal companies, respectively.4 3 Both measures of
the litigation rate declined as a result of the depression in the late 1890s,

and declined again after 1910. But in the period between the peak
reached in the early 1890s and the year 1910, the trend in the population-

based measure of the litigation rate is upward, while the trend in the
production-based measure is steady or slightly downward.
While coal production is a plausible measure of the risk of injury,
given the highly implausible assumptions of the constant man-hours and
constant working conditions to produce a ton of coal, it may also be an

inaccurate one. Another measure of the rate of litigation by employees
against coal companies can be constructed using the accident statistics
41. Automobile accident cases provide a useful explanatory contrast. Due to the widespread use
of the automobile, population is a plausible proxy for the risk of accidents because the number of
cars is roughly in proportion to the size of the population. For a discussion of further problems with
even this straightforward argument about the relationship between population and one kind of litigation, see Lempert, supra note 23, at 127-28.
42. Criminology is familiar with the problem of selecting an appropriate base for a rate which
accurately represents the proportion of opportunities for a particular kind of behavior, which actually results in that behavior. See Black, Production of Crime Rates, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 733 (1970).
One commentator has argued that population has limited value as a surrogate for opportunities for
some types of litigation. See Lempert, supra note 23.
43. I will argue that the statistical predictability of accidents fails to distinguish between two
categories of accidents to individual miners. The first includes accidents caused by routine occupational hazards such as falling roof slate, mine cars, and electricity. The second consists of occasional
disasters due to explosions. The coal operators' level of concern about each source of injury was
likely to have been quite different. See infra Section V.
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compiled by the West Virginia Department of Mines. 4 The number of
accidents is a direct measure of the number of events which gave rise to
litigation. Therefore, the ratio of accidents litigated to accidents occurring should be the best measure of the role played by litigation relative to
other means of resolving conflict. The only apparent difficulty with using
the accident statistics of the West Virginia Department of Mines is a
serious one. The accident statistics of the West Virginia Department of
Mines were based on self-reports. The Department was desperately understaffed, making verification of the reports impossible.4 5 Accidents in
the earliest statistics, beginning in 1888, are almost certainly underre-

ported, and therefore likely to create the impression of higher initial litigation rates relative to later ones. Nevertheless, the ratio of cases litigated
to accidents reported did not steadily decline. In Table 2, I have grouped
the ratio of cases to accidents by five-year intervals similar to the fiveyear average used in plotting measures of the litigation rates in Figure 4.

In the second period, 1891 to 1895, the ratio of cases to accidents is highest, almost certainly due to the underreporting of accidents by coal companies. During the following five years, 1896 to 1900, all types of
litigation declined. Between 1901 and 1905, the proportion of accidents

resulting in litigation rose again to almost two and one-half times its size
in the preceding period. After 1906, the rate declined in two successive
periods, reaching its lowest value in the interval in which workmen's
compensation was adopted.
44.

West Virginia, Department of Mines annual reports contain accident statistics by county.
1883 ANNUAL REPORT (1884) [hereinafter WEsr VIRGINIA
DEP'T OF MINES]. Accident statistics were examined in the Annual Reports of the years 1883
through 1925. However, Annual Reports were not available for the years 1884 through 1887. The
1883 Annual Report was the first Annual Report presented by the State Inspector of mines to the
governor of West Virginia. An 1887 statute required the superintendent of a mine to report "loss of
life or serious personal injury" due to a coal mine accident to the mine inspector for the district.
1887 W. Va. Acts c.50, § 15 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 488 (1913)). Because this information was
based in large part on self-reports, it is apparent that there were wide variations in the perceived
threshold of reportable injuries. The cause and nature of the injury involved in each accident is
described in the report. From this information, it may be inferred that some lasting bodily injury,
such as a broken bone, a severe burn or laceration, or a concussion, was required before an accident
made it into the reports. A mere bump or bruise, after which the worker continued to mine coal, was
unlikely to be reported. This suggests that a loss of work time of at least a day was required for
reporting an accident, and perhaps a loss of a good deal more than one day was the rule for many
mine owners. "Accident" should be understood in light of this variable, but significant, minimum
standard.
45. G. Massay, Coal Consolidation: Profile of the Fairmont Field of Northern West Virginia,
1852-1903 (1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (West Virginia University). Massay describes the
establishment of the Office of Mine Inspector and the effective undermining of the powers of the
office in spite of repeated efforts in the legislature to increase the inspector's power. Id. at 135-41.
WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF MINES,
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Figure 4

Litigation Rates for Tort Cases against Coal Companies

(per 10,000 population) inThree West Virginia State Circuit Courts
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1913 Workmens' Compensation Act Passed by West Virginia Legislature

Each of the three measures of the industrial accident litigation rate
in Figure 4 yields different trends at various points in time. Yet those
trends converge in two important respects. First, the rate of litigation of
accidents against coal companies rose well into the first decade of the
twentieth century. While the steepness of the slope of the trend is highly
dependent upon the base used to represent it, the trend consistently appears across all three measures. Second, the industrial accident litigation
rate began declining sometime before 1910, well before the adoption of
workmen's compensation in 1913.46 While I have no similar data with
which to create alternative measures of the industrial accident litigation
rate against railroads, the population-based measure for railroads de46.

W. VA. CODE §§ 1-56 (1913).
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TABLE 2
ACCIDENTS TO MINERS, CASES AND LITIGATION RATES,
FAYETrE COUNTY, 1887-1915.

CASES

YEAR

ACCIDENTS

1887

20

0

1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

23*
25
31
19
35
41
36*
36*
33
51
43
57
102
72
73
72
77
128
135
164
238
276

2
2
0
1
2
5
7
2
4
1
0
1
2
9
0
16
3
3
1
1
4
6

1910

279

42

1911
1912
1913
1914
1915

215
190
157
144
533

2
1
16
5
1

RATE

.04

.10

.028

.073

.049

.02

*Estimated

scribed similar trends. This trend in accident litigation against railroads
is counter to expectations concerning the effects of both the common law
and the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Under the more restrictive
common-law rules in force up to 1908, the litigation rate went up. Under
the more liberal Federal Employers' Liability Act, the litigation rate
went down.
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The Common Law

The search for the causes of change in the rate of litigation must
begin by examining the decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. A change in common-law doctrine which favored plaintiffs, or a
change in the sympathies of the court in applying the doctrine to industrial accident cases, might explain the rising litigation rate. The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals played a role in all tort litigation,
specifically industrial accident litigation, by articulating rules of law
which governed the availability of judicial remedies. It is certainly plausible that common-law rules influenced the behavior of judges and lawyers.
In turn, the behavior of these intermediaries affected the use of the courts
for dispute resolution. It is also likely that the rules directly influenced
the behavior of those whom they were intended to govern, among them
employers who bore a legal duty of care toward others. I will examine
both the changes in the common law between 1870 and 1910, and the
pattern of decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals with
respect to the liability of coal companies and railroads.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals followed the legal authority of other jurisdictions, which severeiy restricted the liability of employers for work-related injuries suffered by employees.4 7 The early West
Virginia cases on employer liability are based on legal precedent which
the court interpreted as established American views of the fellow servant
rule and the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence.4" In the West Virginia of the 1880s, the doctrine of assumption of
risk was interpreted as permitting an employee to recover for an injury
caused by hazards in the work area, if the employee had both no knowledge of, and no control over, the hazards.49 An 1883 statute on mine
safety required coal mine owners to take certain precautions against the
accumulation of methane gas, and an early case opened the door to re47. The State of West Virginia was created in 1864, and its supreme court of appeals was created in 1872. In its early years the supreme court of appeals looked to other states for common-law
principles. The law of negligence had already taken shape in other jurisdictions and was embodied in
widely cited treaties. The court's most commonly cited source was T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1869). The court also cited cases from a wide variety of
jurisdictions, including Texas, Illinois, Michigan, and various eastern jurisdictions. With regard to
the laws of liability governing employees, the court frequently cited H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT (1877), as well as D. RORER, RAILROADS (1884), and C. PATTERSON, RAILWAY ACCIDENT
LAW (1886).

48. Berns v. Gaston Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285 (1885); Riley v. Railway, 27 W. Va. 145 (1885);
Cooper v. P.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 24 W. Va. 37 (1884). See also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying

text.
49. See Cooper, 24 W. Va. 37, 48.

1987]

SOCIAL CHANGE AND TORT LITIGATION

covery through this statute by allowing the jury to decide the question of
whether an employer used ordinary care to prevent an explosion." A
later West Virginia case took a harder line on this issue, holding that an
employee assumes the risk of such hazards even if reasonable precautions
against danger have not been taken. 1 Under the common law, the duty
of care owed by railroads to passengers and bystanders was greater than
that owed to employees. 2 Moreover, between 1895 and 1905 the
supreme court of appeals enlarged the duty of care railroads owed the
public. 3
The barrier created by the legal doctrines applied to employer liability is reflected in the outcomes of decisions by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. Between 1890 and 1899 the court decided 144 cases
TABLE 3
PERCENT OF WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF
APPEALS DECISIONS FAVORING DEFENDANT
COMPANIES BY TYPE OF CASE BY TIME

PERIOD
COAL CO.
EMPLOYEE
ACCIDENT

RAILROAD
EMPLOYEE
ACCIDENT

OTHER
RAILROAD
TORT

OTHER
COAL/RAIL
CASE

1890-1899

80%

(5)

80%

(35)

59%

(51)

54.7%

(53)

144

1900-1909

67%

(18)

44% (9)

39%

(33)

51.6%

(99)

159

TIME
PERIOD

N OF
CASES

involving a railroad or a coal company. Thirty-five of these were tort
suits brought by employees against railroads, fifty-one were tort suits
brought against railroads by nonemployees, and only five were tort suits
brought by coal company employees against coal companies. The rest
were nontort litigation. Appeals in both railroad and coal company employee injury cases were decided in favor of the company approximately
80% of the time (thirty-one of forty cases). The degree of favor shown
50. W. VA. CODE § 5, ch. 70 (1883); Berns, 27 W. Va. 285, 305.
51. Seldomridge v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 569, 33 S.E. 293 (1899).
52. See Bess v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 492, 14 S.E. 234 (1891); Carrico v. West
Virginia Cent. & Pa. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 389, 14 S.E. 234 (1891); Cooper, 24 W. Va. 37.
53. Compare Bess v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 492, 14 S.E. 234 (1891) with Bias v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 46 W. Va. 349, 33 S.E. 240 (1899). These cases involved a widely known
rivalry between two justices of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Marmaduke Dent and
Henry Brannon. Justice Dent was an early proponent of the deep pocket theory of liability, while
Justice Brannon endorsed the classic laissez-faire view of enterprise liability. See J. REID,
MARMADUKE DENT OF WEsT VIRGINIA: AN AMERICAN JUDGE 123-40 (1968).
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companies in employee injury cases is in contrast to the outcomes of
other cases against coal companies and railroads. Nonemployee tort
cases were resolved in the railroads' favor only 59% of the time (thirty of
fifty-one cases). Nontort litigation resulted in a decision for the company
in only 54.7% of the cases (twenty-nine of fifty-three cases).
In the following decade, between 1900 and 1909, the number of employee and passenger injury cases, and the proportion of them won by
defendants, represent a sharp drop in the degree of favor shown railroads. Only nine tort suits by railroad employees were heard by the
court, a sharp drop from the previous decade. Eighteen cases were
brought against coal companies by employees. The number of cases
brought against railroads for injuries to persons who were not employees
dropped to thirty-three, also down from the previous decade. The remaining cases involving railroads and coal companies heard in the 1900
to 1909 period were nontort litigation, and comprised nearly two-thirds
of the total (ninety-three cases), a much larger proportion than in the
previous decade. Outcomes increasingly favored employees and passengers over railroads. Only 44% of the railroad employee tort cases (four of
nine cases) were decided in the railroads' favor, a dramatic drop from
nearly 80% in the previous decade. Coal companies won 67% of the tort
cases against them (twelve of eighteen cases), also down from the approximate 80% they won in the decade before. The railroad won only 39%
(thirteen of thirty-three) of the nonemployee tort cases, down from 59%
in the previous decade. The decisions in nontort cases favored the company 51.6% of the time (forty-eight of ninety-three cases) compared to
54
54.7% for the previous decade.
The strong stand taken by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, maintaining the common-law rules barring recovery by coal company employees, could not have gone unnoticed by attorneys handling
cases at the circuit court level. The rising rate of accident litigation
against coal companies after 1900 was unlikely to have been the result of
the marginal improvement in the rate of decisions favoring plaintiffs in
the decade between 1900 and 1909. Railroads, however, were in a differ54. From its creation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had nearly complete discretion over its caseload, one of the very few state supreme courts to possess this power. One interpretation of a decline in appeals, therefore, is that the court of appeals refused to hear them. Statistics
published by the state auditor indicate that the court declined about 25% of all requests for appeals.
AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 1877-1878 BIENNIAL REPORT (1879). The Biennial
Reports for the years 1879-80 to 1925-26 were also examined to reveal the 25% declination of requests for appeals. However, we do not know how the court used its discretion to suppress or encourage particular issues.
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ent position. Even though the common law governing recovery by railroad employees did not change until passage of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in 1908, 55 injured railroad employees, as well as injured
nonemployees, enjoyed significantly greater success before the court in
the later decade. 56 The change in the duty of care owed to nonemployees,
together with the increasing proportion of employee and nonemployee
cases lost by railroads, might well explain the rapidly rising litigation rate
against railroads in the circuit courts after 1900. However, it does not
explain the decline in the rate of tort litigation in the circuit courts
against railroads which began before 1910.
B.

Outcome in the Trial Courts

If the rising rate of coal company accident cases cannot be explained
by changes in appellate court decisions, it may alternatively be explained
by outcomes in the state trial courts. Whatever the apparent sympathies
of the appellate judges, most cases were resolved by the circuit courts.5 7
If the state circuit courts increasingly favored miners in accident litigation it is logical to suggest that more cases would be brought to court.
Table 4 presents data which allow an evaluation of this hypothesis. As
the data demonstrate, plaintiffs won approximately 56% of the cases
brought in the three circuit courts. This success rate dropped by approximately 11% if the defendant was a company. However, of those cases
which went to trial against coal companies, plaintiffs won over 85% of
the time. This success rate by plaintiffs suing coal companies is not
greatly different from the success rate of all plaintiffs in all trials.5 8 It
appears that the only advantage enjoyed by coal companies was that they
were able to settle 10% more of the cases brought against them than
were individual defendants. Suits against individuals were settled in 36%
of the cases. Suits against coal companies were settled in 43.6% of the
cases, which was also the average settlement rate for all company
defendants.
55. See supra note 29.
56. See cases cited supra note 53.
57. Between 1872 and 1925, 218 cases were brought against coal companies seeking compensation for mining accidents. Of these, only 13, representing less than 6% of the cases, ended in an
appeal heard by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Similarly, only about 4% of all circuit
court accident litigation against railroads ended in an appeal. Table 4 presents a summary of these
statistics.
58. Plaintiffs won nearly 90% of the trials. This success rate dropped only 5% if the defendant
was a company, but there was great variation between types of companies. For example, banks lost a
substantially greater proportion of the cases they defended, while railroads won a larger proportion.
See Munger, supra note 22, at 337.
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In accident cases brought by employees, however, coal companies
fared much better. Judgment for the employee was entered in only 16%
of the cases, while plaintiffs won a judgment in 45.6% of all cases
brought against coal companies. Coal companies settled 63.8% of all accident cases, but only 43.6% of the total number of cases against coal
companies were settled. The low rate of judgment for miners is only
partly explained by their high settlement rate. Of the accident cases
which actually went to trial, miners won less than 50%, while all plaintiffs enjoyed an 85.8% trial success rate against coal companies.
Over time, the proportion of miners winning at trial varied considerably. As the average success rates for five-year periods in Table 4 demonstrate, before 1905 miners won less than 50% of the cases which went to
trial, with the exception of two periods in which only a very small
number of cases was initiated. Between 1906 and 1910, however, miners
won 58.8% of the trials, and in the next three five-year periods miners
won 45%, 100%, and 61.5% of the trials respectively.
The pattern of outcomes in industrial accident cases brought by
miners does not explain the rising tort litigation rate against coal companies between 1900 and 1910. Employees of coal companies fared better in
the state trial courts as time passed, but their success followed, rather
than preceded, the increase in the litigation rate. Unless employees, or
their lawyers, or both, anticipated a change in the sympathies of judges
and juries, the subtle changes in outcomes evidenced by these data do not
explain the increase in tort litigation. This conclusion is reinforced by a
further statistical analysis which revealed no statistically significant correlation between tort litigation brought against coal companies and the
percent of trials won by employees in the previous year.' 9 The absence of
any correlation suggests that employees, lawyers, and others who may
have participated in decisions to litigate against coal companies were not
persuaded to favor litigation by the outcomes of tort cases. If a sea
change in the attitudes of judges and juries was anticipated, it remains to
59.

Regression analyses of industrial accident litigation rates confirm many of the conclusions

reached in this essay on the basis of interpretation of the figures which appear in the text. Regression
analysis is a statistical procedure that estimates the extent to which two numerical characteristics of

the object or events being studied covary. A statistically significant covariance revealed by regression
analysis may be interpreted as evidence of the presence of a causal relationship between the charac-

teristics used in the regression analysis. Causal connections between economic fluctuations, the adoption of remedial legislation, changes in the pattern of trial court outcomes, and the rate of litigation
were analyzed by means of statistical regressions. Specifically, regression of the rate of tort litigation
against coal companies on the percentage of trials favoring the employers during the previous year
revealed no statistically significant relationship.
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be documented and its effects on potential litigants explained.6"

Railroads, as defendants in the state trial courts, faced a mix of tort
cases which was different from those faced by coal companies. Railroads

were sued not only by employees for injuries suffered in the course of
employment, but also by passengers, trespassers, and persons whose
property had been damaged by railroad operations.6 1 Plaintiffs in all
types of litigation against railroads won judgments only 21.8% of the
time, compared with a 46% average against both coal companies and all

types of companies considered together. The lower success rate of plaintiffs suing railroads may be explained in part by the railroads' tendency

to settle a much larger proportion of cases than other companies. Railroads settled 65.6% of the time, while coal companies settled 43.6% of
the cases against them. However, the higher settlement rate by railroads

does not explain the difference in outcomes after trial. In trials against
railroads plaintiffs won only 69.9% of the cases, compared with an
85.8% success rate for plaintiffs in cases brought against coal companies.
Railroad attorneys may, of course, have been more selective in the cases
which they allowed to go to trial.
Notwithstanding the mix of employee and nonemployee tort litigation against railroads, there were strong similarities in the outcomes of

tort cases brought against railroads and those brought against coal companies. A similar proportion of tort cases were settled by both types of

companies, with coal companies settling 63.8%, and railroads settling
59.3%. The similarity extends to removal of cases to federal court as
well. Even though most railroads were incorporated out of state, while

most coal companies were West Virginia corporations, about the same
percentage of tort cases against each type of company was removed by

the defendant to federal district court.62
60. The standard histories of the adoption of workmen's compensation document the concerns
of commissions established to examine the problem, but not the level of concern by the public, or
changes in working class attitudes toward compensation. One helpful study documented the debate
among lawyers in a number of states. Steidle, "Reasonable"Reform: The Attitude ofBench and Bar

Toward Liability Law and Workmen's Compensation, in

BUILDING THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCI-

ETY: ESSAYS ON ASsOCIATED AcriVrrms IN MODERN AMERICA 31 (J. Israel ed. 1972).
61. By far the largest number of cases brought against railroads in the circuit courts were appeals from decisions by the justices of the peace. These cases typically involved property damage. See
F. Munger, Capitalists in Court in the Progressive Era: Did the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? (1987)
(unpublished manuscript, available from the author).
62. Although the percentages of tort cases removed to federal court were virtually the same
between both types of companies, when all types of cases are compared far fewer coal cases were
transferred to federal courts. See Munger, supranote 22, at 337. This may have been a coal company
trial strategy in tort cases, although state courts appear to have favored coal companies slightly over
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The facts that similar proportions of all types of tort litigation were
settled and that similar proportions of tort cases were removed to federal
court suggest that attorneys may have played a significant role in selecting strategies. Decisions to settle or to remove a case to federal court
reflect litigation strategies in which counsel for the defendant played a
decisive role. The hypothesis that there was a pronounced tendency
among the regional bar to settle any tort case is suggested by comparing
the outcomes of tort suits brought against individuals with those brought
against company defendants. In tort litigation by individuals against
other individuals, settlement occurred about 58% of the time. Similarly
coal companies reached settlement in 63.8% of their cases, and railroads
settled in 59.3% of their litigation. These three figures are strikingly
close, suggesting that there was in fact a strong predisposition among
members of the bar to settle tort cases, regardless of the defendants
involved.
While the rates of settlement and removal of tort cases by coal companies and railroads were similar, there was a significant difference between the proportion of cases the two types of companies won at trial. In
suits against railroads in state courts, plaintiffs won 63.1% of the trials,
while plaintiffs in suits against coal companies won 49%. Furthermore,
the proportion won at trial by plaintiffs suing railroads increased from
40% between 1886 and 1890 to 85.7% between 1916 and 1920. However,
the litigation rate against railroads does not appear to conform to the
fluctuations in outcomes. 63 The peak litigation rate reached in the early
1890s accompanied a relatively low success rate, and followed a period of
equally low success. The rising rate between 1906 and 1910 was accompanied by a relatively low success rate and followed a period of moderately high success for plaintiffsfr4
railroads. Alternatively, it may reflect choices by lawyers who preferred to litigate locally against

nonresident coal companies.
63. In estimating the rate of tort litigation against railroads we are hampered by the lack of
accident statistics for any unit approaching the size of the region under study. As a result, the
conclusion that the litigation rate against railroads was rising rests on the assumption that occasions
for accident litigation increased in rough proportion to the size of the population. This assumption is
not unreasonable, since it is likely that the number of passenger accidents is proportional to the
number of passenger miles traveled. It is less certain that employee injuries bore a strong relationship
to the size of the counties' population.
64. The conclusion that the outcome of trials at the circuit court level did not predict a rising or
falling litigation rate was confirmed by regression analysis. A statistically significant relationship
between the rate of litigation and the proportion of trials won by similar plaintiffs in the preceding
year was not found by means of a regression analysis of the effects of trial court outcomes on tort
litigation against coal companies, or tort litigation against railroads. See supranote 59. It is possible,
however, that a more complex lagged effect was present combining the effects of other factors or
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The apparent absence of a relationship between the results of all tort
cases against railroads and the overall trend in initiating tort litigation
against railroads does not mean that there is no similar relationship
within particular types of tort cases brought against railroads. As noted
earlier, tort litigation against railroads consisted of a mixture of distinct
types of cases, predicated on liability to employees, passengers, bystanders, or even trespassers. Since the rules governing liability for injury to
employees were different from the rules governing liability for injury to
nonemployees, the two should be considered separately. Between 1890
and 1899, personal injury litigation against railroads in the three state
circuit courts consisted of approximately 50% each of employee injury
litigation and nonemployee injury litigation.6 5 Since the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals liberalized the rules of liability to nonemployees, one might expect the ratio of employee to nonemployee suits to
change, reflecting a greater proportion of nonemployee cases. But the
proportion did not change over time. However, there were differences in
the outcomes of the two classes of cases in the circuit courts, and the
pattern of outcomes of nonemployees' cases changed over time. The
overwhelming majority of employee cases ended in settlement. While
nearly all of the employee cases going to trial were won by the railroad
employee, fewer than 15% actually went to trial. This pattern did not
change after 1900, and it did not even change after the adoption of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Nonemployee cases went to trial at a
rate of approximately 57% between 1890 and 1899, and at a rate of about
85% between 1900 and 1909. In addition, the rate of success at trial for
nonemployee personal injury plaintiffs suing railroads went up from 40%
between 1890 and 1899 to 60% between 1900 and 1909.
These patterns of railroad litigation by employees and nonemployees
are consistent with reasonable expectations of the effects of appellate decisions. The tort law applied by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals increasingly favored nonemployees. The increasing success of
nonemployees in trials in the circuit courts was consistent with the trend
litigation rates. If so, the regression model applied would not have captured it. It seems unlikely,
however, that there is any very precise relationship between circuit court outcomes and the rate of
litigation. The findings suggest that other factors have a substantially greater effect on litigation
rates.
65. The statistics describing the proportions and outcomes of employee versus nonemployee
personal injury litigation are based on an examination of a one-third sample of case files drawn at

random from the tort cases heard by the Fayette County Circuit Court. Due to the absence of formal
pleadings in most files, it was only possible to distinguish the various types of personal injury cases
after an inspection of the depositions and testimony of witnesses. See supra note 22.
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in appellate doctrine. 6 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did
not relax the doctrinal barriers to recovery by railroad employees, yet its
decisions increasingly favored employees. This may explain in part why
circuit court filings by employees kept pace with filings by nonemployees
over the two decades. Far fewer employee cases were ever tried. The
threat of a decision on appeal favoring the employee may have been sufficient to force settlement without trial, even though the law favored employers until the passage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 1908.
Furthermore, neither the rate nor the favorable employee outcomes in
litigation against railroads increased after 1908, when the Federal Employers' Liability Act overrode the common-law rules restricting recovery by railroad employees. In fact, between 1910 and 1915, the litigation
rates against railroads for both employees and nonemployees declined,
and were generally lower after 1915 than in earlier periods. In light of the
considerations above, it appears that neither rules of law nor trends in
circuit court outcomes can explain the decline in tort litigation against
railroads.
C. Litigation and Mine Disasters
One of the simplest explanations of the increasing number of tort
cases by coal company employees against coal companies is that the
number of accidents increased.6" Not only were there more accidents, but
the nature of the accidents underscored the problems of mine safety and
the plight of miners. The hazards of mining became a national issue, due
in part to a series of disasters which occurred in Fayette County in 1900
and 1907, and in Monongah, West Virginia, where more than 460 miners
were killed.68 In addition, Table 2 illustrates that even in the absence of
major disasters, accidents kept pace with the steady increases in production. The impact of these events on the success rate of miners in court
can be examined by statistical means. A regression analysis demonstrates
that the number of deaths due to explosions was a statistically significant
predictor of the success rate of miners in any given year.69 If mine disas66. See supra Section IV(A).
67. For example, the statewide number of reported mining deaths rose from 20 in 1883, the year
the report first appeared, to 521 in 1914. WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF MINES, 1916 ANNUAL
REPORT 231 (1917).
68. See W. GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 3.
69. Using data from the years 1897-1918, a regression analysis was performed to determine if a
statistically significant relationship existed between the percentage of trials won by miners and several potential causal factors. These factors included: (1) the number of fatalities in mining accidents
that year; (2) the wage level of miners; (3) the percent increase in coal production that year; and (4)
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ters influenced judges and juries, they may also have created a climate in
which miners or surviving relatives were encouraged to bring suits for
compensation, even before the trend in circuit court outcomes was
apparent.
D.

Union Organizing

Union organizing in Fayette County reached a climax between 1902
and 1903.70 The United Mine Workers of America, following a series of
unsuccessful strikes in states whose coal production competed with coal
from West Virginia, found that it could not maintain successful concerted action as long as West Virginia mines remained unorganized. John
Mitchell assumed the presidency of the Union in 1899 on a platform
committing him to organizing West Virginia miners. The strikes in 1902
and 1903 were of a magnitude not approached by previous or subsequent
efforts of the union in West Virginia. In an effort to achieve recognition
of the union, more than eighty mines were struck in Fayette alone.
During the strike years of 1902 and 1903 a record number of claims
for compensation for mining injuries were filed by miners against coal
companies in the Fayette County Circuit Court, even in the face of
steadfast hostility to such claims by the West Virginia Court of Appeals.
The coinciding of worker mobilization with record numbers of court
claims suggests that union organizing may have affected workers' perceptions of the value of claims. Alternatively, unions may have increased the
sense of efficacy of individual claimants who pursued legal remedies beyond the point at which they might otherwise have been dissuaded by an
attorney. As described previously in Table 2, of the five, five-year periods
between 1890 and 1915, the first, 1891 to 1895, had the highest litigation
rate. This first period included the wave of strikes called by the United
Mine Workers of America in 1895. The litigation rate is also high between 1901 and 1905, the period of greatest strike activity. Conversely,
the litigation rate for the last period, 1906-1910, which had considerably
less strike activity, is lower.
It should be noted that the remaining period, 1896 to 1900, had the
lowest litigation rate, even though a major strike wave occurred in 1898.
However, these strikes were motivated by a 20% reduction in wages durthe number of strikes in the three counties. The analysis revealed that there was a statistically significant relationship between trial outcomes and the other factors. The results indicated that the statistical relationship found by the analysis could be expected to occur by chance only 5% of the time.
70. See J. Thomas, Coal Country: The Rise of the Southern Smokeless Coal Industry and its
Effects on Area Development, 1872-1910, at 232-71 (1971) (unpublished doctoral dissertation).
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ing the preceding few years, not by issues which characterized the strikes
of 1902 and 1903. These latter strikes focused on issues of union recognition, more proactive claims for checkweighmen, and ant end to company
store monopolies. Nonetheless, this distinction is not particularly persuasive as an explanation of the difference in litigation rates, because it does
not explain why this particular difference between the strike waves would
have had such a marked effect on the rate of litigation of accident claims.
A more plausible explanation lies in the fact that the rates of all types of
litigation decreased sharply during the depression years of the late 1890s.
It appears that the rate of litigation of accident claims during the five
year interval between 1896 and 1900 was affected by factors which depressed all litigation rates, and absent these factors the coal mine accident litigation rate would have resembled the two other periods of strike
activity.
The argument for a strong relationship between collective action
and tort litigation must also be qualified in light of other evidence. The
issues raised in 1902 and 1903 by Fayette County strikers had nothing to
do with safety. 7 Indeed, safety was not an issue on the agenda of the
United Mine Workers of America until after 1910, and then it focused on
certification for miners, accepting the employers' own hypothesis that
careless and incompetent miners caused mine accidents and disasters.7 2
It is possible to suggest that miners themselves accepted many of the
values of self-reliance which were embodied in the common-law rules
that emphasized employee responsibility.73 What bothered West Virginia
miners more than safety was the total domination by owners in the company towns. Even wages came out a poor seventh on the list of demands
prepared by Fayette miners.7 4 These characteristics of the 1902 and 1903
strikes hardly suggest that collective action had a direct effect on claims
for liability. Rather, they suggest that because customary values of selfreliance formed the basis for many of the claims which miners did make,
miners themselves may not have been the principal factor in the tort litigation patterns of 1900 to 1910.11
71. Id. at 257.
72. See W. GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 112-13, 115.
73. Id. at 112-18.
74. D. CORBIN, supra note 17, at 32-33.
75. An alternative interpretation is that miners felt a greater sense of personal importance,
brought more cases to attorneys, and sought personal compensation regardless of union objectives.
The relationship between collective and individual action is far from clear. One study of the complaints brought to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination demonstrated that collective action can motivate and direct individual action. However, whether this affects individual
behavior in other conflicts with the same adversaries is not clear from the study. L. MAYHEW, LAW
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E. Lawyers
Attorneys may have had the most important influence on litigation
trends. It is not known how they selected cases for litigation. It is known
that they represented working class litigants in some causes of action,
significantly torts. The contingent fee was utilized in other parts of the

country, although its use was associated with a minority of attorneys
who specialized in personal injury cases.7 6 Consistent with this national
pattern, representation in industrial accident cases in Fayette County was
undertaken by a relatively small number of attorneys who specialized in
such litigation. Only twenty-nine different attorneys handled accident
cases in Fayette prior to 1900.77 Moreover, one attorney, through a combination of partnerships with different lawyers, handled between 25%

and 30% of all industrial accident litigation in the county. Not surprisingly, the same lawyer also represented the miners in the eviction cases in
1901.78 Between 1900 and 1910, the number of plaintiffs' attorneys increased by only 40% while the number of accidents increased by about
300% and the number of cases brought by about 200%. 7 9 Several of the

attorneys who represented plaintiffs prior to 1900 also represented the
companies in similar litigation. Although many of the plaintiffs' attorneys continued their involvement with these types of cases after 1900,
there were few who represented both sides, with many attorneys moving

to exclusive representation of the companies.
An analysis of the claims brought before 1900 shows that 44% were

for fatalities, while the remainder involved injuries which were nonfatal.
After 1900, more than 63% of the cases were fatalities. The trend, it can
AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: A STUDY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (1968).

76. See J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 295-300 (1950); Friedman
& Ladinsky, supra note 34, at 60.
77. These proportions are based on an examination of the case files of one-third of the tort cases
brought in Fayette County over the period of the study. See supra note 22.
78. To contemporaries concerned about the lapse in ethics of a rapidly expanding profession,
the mention of an attorney who specialized in personal injury litigation often brought to mind an
"ambulance chaser"-a member of the bar of low repute and loose professional morals. See J.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 48-49

(1976). By contrast, C.W. Osenton, the member of the Fayette County bar referred to here, was an
attorney of high repute. C. W. Osenton's career included distinctions equal to many of his Fayette
contemporaries, and hardly follows the pattern of ambulance chasers which this description may
have brought to mind. What may have set Osenton apart was his reputation as a criminal defense
lawyer. This specialization may have provided an easy transition to the role of plaintiff's lawyer in
accident litigation without loss of position in the local bar. See BENCH AND BAR OF WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 32, at 300-01.
79. See supra note 22.
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be argued, showed an increasingly conservative selection of cases by attorneys, perhaps in response to the continuing hostility of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The number of mine disasters in
Fayette County between 1900 and 1910 must have given attorneys a macabre satisfaction since they provided many fatalities to litigate which
would appeal strongly to a jury's sympathies. These figures also support
the argument that the practice of accident litigation may have become
more specialized after 1900. It might be argued, for example, that increasingly conservative case selection may explain the relative decline in
the litigation rates between the first and last periods presented in Table 2.
This argument would suggest that the cases brought between 1891 and
1895 are a fair representation of the injuries which actually occurred,
while the cases brought by a more specialized bar after 1900 reflected
more careful selection, since the actual number of injuries increased,
while the number of cases decreased.

V.

TORT LITIGATION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF TORT LAW REFORM

The mainstream and revisionist theories of reform in the law of industrial accidents both maintained that change in the common law was
motivated in part by the costs of litigation, including the costs of
nonrecovery.80 Mainstream theory describes workmen's compensation as
an example of "collective problem solving."8 1 This view holds that it is
the function of law to provide clear rules for the determination of liability
and the payment of compensation. 82 According to this theory, the fellow
servant rule initially provided such a guideline, but performed this task
less and less well in the late nineteenth century, due to an accumulation
of conflicting interpretations and an increasing dissatisfaction with the
distributive effects of the rule at the trial court level. When the rule no
longer performed efficiently, it was identified as a problem by employers,
workers, and the public, resulting in a collective solution to the problem.
This collective solution was embodied in legislative action adopting a
rule consistent with the need of management and labor for a predictable,
reliable, and fair form of compensation. 83 The revisionist theory of the
80. See supra notes 35 & 36.
81. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 34, at 51.
82. Id. at 62.
83. Id. at 71-72. This hypothesis fails to consider any alternative means of achieving predictability, such as insurance and manipulation of the settlement process by attorneys. See H. SMITH, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION INSURANCE: A SERIES OF LECTURES DELIYERED BEFORE THE
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adoption of workmen's compensation argues that social legislation was
proposed by businesses to reduce the destructive effects of market conflict
and class conflict.8 4 According to this view, workmen's compensation
may have appealed to mine owners for two reasons. First, as a means of
reducing the unpredictable costs of litigation, and second, as a means of
controlling an inflammatory issue in worker-employer relations.
These arguments about the importance of the costs of litigation can
be examined in light of the West Virginia experience. The argument that
recovery under the common law was increasingly inefficient, or unpredictable, is based on the fact that the fellow servant doctrine became increasingly complex at the end of the nineteenth century.85 The argument
presumes that increasing complexity in the doctrinal law necessarily results in an increased uncertainty of outcomes at the trial level.8 6 Yet, in
West Virginia, prior to the adoption of workmen's compensation there
was a highly routinized system for handling cases arising from industrial
accidents. In contrast to the bulk of the cases in the West Virginia circuit
courts, most accident cases, both industrial and other types, were settled
before trial.8 7 This consideration, in conjunction with the facts that the
regional bar was small in number, and that an even smaller number of
attorneys represented the accident litigators, leaves little doubt that there
existed a compensation system with a high degree of predictability. 8
No doubt the routinization of accident cases was to the great satisfaction of the defendant companies, since it minimized the intrusion of
accident liability on the business of production and profit. In the correspondence of Justus Collins, a major coal mine owner of the period, there
is little prior to 1910 to suggest that injuries to his employees, however
frequent, were of great concern in his business planning."9 Because in the
INSURANCE INSTiTrrUTE OF HARTFORD 66-67 (1913) (commenting on settlement practices of insurance company lawyers).
84. See supra note 35.

85.

This argument is documented in Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 34, at 59-65.

86.

For a lucid elaboration of the argument implicit in Friedman and Ladinsky's article see R.

LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

92-93 (1986).

87. See supra Section IV(B).
88. Notwithstanding the differences in capacity and interest between individual defendants and
company defendants in tort litigation, the outcomes of tort suits brought against individuals were
identical to the outcomes of tort suits against companies, suggesting that the tendency toward routinization was very strong.
89. The conclusion is based on an examination of the business correspondence of Collins
through 1910. During this period his growing suspicion of unionization among miners led Collins to
attribute mine explosions to union organizers. D. CORBIN, supra note 17, at 109. After 1910, as
scientific evidence of the sources of coal dust ignition mounted, Collins revised his view of the causes
of accidents. Similarly, as the concept of workmen's compensation became accepted, he and his
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period up to 1910 the number of accidents closely parallels the number of
tons of coal produced, it appears that accidents may have become just
another cost of doing business. It may be concluded, therefore, that in
West Virginia the outcomes of industrial accident litigation were not
inefficient from the perspective of employers.
Revisionist theory argues that it was not unpredictability but the
high cost of litigation which persuaded many employers to accept workmen's compensation. Under a revisionist analysis, as the number of industrial accidents increased, the potential liability of employers would
also increase if accidents gave rise to litigation. However, the fact is that
tort litigation, including industrial accident litigation, was a rare event.
Because some recovery was typical in most cases filed in court, the system should have encouraged litigation of claims. Yet, only about five percent of all coal mine accidents resulted in litigation. At the peak rate,
only about four accident cases were brought against coal companies for
every million tons of coal produced. 9° Consequently, since coal employers faced relatively little accident litigation, the revisionist argument that
litigation costs led them to workmen's compensation appears inaccurate.
It might be argued that the rate of industrial accident litigation was
low because the common-law rules governing employer liability created
defenses that few employees could hope to overcome. 91 Doubt may be
cast on this hypothesis, however, by the lack of evidence demonstrating
the influence of appellate court doctrine on trial outcomes, or on the decisions of litigants to litigate. As previously noted, fluctuations in the rate
of trial court litigation of industrial accident claims demonstrated no
clear relationship to the pattern of decisions of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 92 The absence of a clear relationship between
appellate decisions and the rate of litigation at the trial level suggests that
appellate decisions could not have been the most important factor in producing fluctuations in the rate of litigation. Nevertheless, the barriers
presented by the common law, and the perceived judicial hostility to employee accident claims at the appellate level, may have been daily concerns of the legal and the social systems deflecting many potential
93
claims.
managers demonstrated growing support for both mine safety and an adequate compensation system
for miners. W. GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 144-45, 160.
90. See supra Section IV.

91. See supra Section IV(A).
92. Id.
93. The hypothesis that the legal culture at the trial court level was largely unaffected by appellate decisions and was based, in part, on the assumption that courts were hostile to employee claims,
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Industrial accident litigation rates may have been low for reasons

which had nothing to do with tort law. There is little evidence miners
were frustrated by the ineffectiveness of litigation in obtaining compensa-

tion. We do not know whether miners were particularly conscious of
their legal fights. That is, whether they thought that litigation was, or
ought to have been, a basis for compensation for accidents. Their pattern

of litigation does not suggest increasing discontentment with the system
of recovery bases on common law. Further, the labor organizations
which they formed did not view safety and the consequences of accidents
as an issue until well after workmen's compensation had become a serious proposal through the efforts of other constituencies.94 Ignorance of
the law may explain part of this inaction. The behavior of the legal pro-

fession undoubtedly played a significant role. But it is also likely that the
attitudes of many miners themselves made it difficult to view the solution
of the problem in terms of government intervention. Factors such as a

tradition of self-reliance, a sense of powerlessness in dealing with employers, and a tendency to blame accidents on foreign-born miners may all
have contributed to this pattern.9 5
Whatever the reason for the low rate of industrial accident litigation, contrary to the claims of revisionist theory, litigation may not have

been onerous for mine owners. Examination of the dollar amounts which
West Virginia mine owners risked losing through industrial accident liti-

gation (exclusive of attorney's fees and court costs) suggests that litigation may have provided a financially manageable system for handling

accident liability from the owner's perspective. Complaints filed in cases
of injury or fatality due to accidents in mines prayed for what must have
seemed substantial damages by contemporary standards, averaging about

$9,300 between 1890 and 1925.96 However, a mine owner's gross revenue
irrespective of the variation in the doctrine that resulted from specific appellate decisions, is an
empirically testable one. I offer no direct evidence here of such a sharp disjunction of legal cultures
at the appellate and trial court levels. I suggest that it is a plausible and important hypothesis for
further research.
94. See supra Section IV(D). See also Weinstein, supra note 35, at 156.
95. The defeatism of miners is explored in J. GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QuirsCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980). Targeting foreign-born miners as
scapegoats was indirectly encouraged by the United Mine Workers of America, through its support
of a program of miner certification as an answer to the problems of accidents. Ironically, this proposed remedy precisely followed the policy underlying the common law, by seeking to shift liability
away from employers and toward foreign-born employees. Statistics were gathered on accidents with
detailed breakdowns by ethnicity, reflecting the tendency to equate accidents with ethnicity. W.
GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 118.
96. Over this period, the maximum claim for personal injury liability in the three circuit courts
was $50,000. Claims against coal companies for property damage averaged $900. Personal injury
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for one million tons of coal was more than $800,000 at the depth of the7
depression of the 1890s, and typically averaged more than $1,200,000.9
Thus, damage claims from injuries to miners averaged between 3% and
5% of an owner's gross revenue, even at the peak rate of litigation of four
cases per million tons. In addition, at least 60% of all cases were settled,
and payments to claimants in these settled cases were likely substantially
below the amount claimed in the pleadings. Consequently, as suggested
earlier, it appears that the revisionist hypothesis regarding the import of
employers' litigation costs may be misguided. Nonetheless, in order to
observe the specific effects of litigation costs on the coal industry, a more
precise analysis is required.
Although the average personal injury damage claim was relatively
low, the cost implications of accident litigation are related to the structure of the industry. The coal industry was highly competitive due to
relatively low entry costs and a large number of competitors. Few details
of the industry's financial structure are known. 8 We do not know typical
net revenues for companies of different sizes, nor do we know whether
coal companies could transfer some of the risk of such loss to insurance
companies. 99 We can only estimate the total costs of litigation. Since accidents were only roughly proportional to production, we do not know
whether more productive companies faced more claims than those less
productive as a result of their higher productivity. Factors explaining
why some companies faced higher damage claims than others may include management capabilities, production financial resources, the use of
machinery, or the use of any other strategies which resulted in safer mining practices.
While the effects of accident litigation on some coal companies may
have been small due to such factors as small claims and a high degree of
routinization in handling claims, for others even a small number of
claims may have had a critical bearing on survival. Small companies may
have been more seriously jeopardized by litigation, while larger compaclaims against railroads averaged $9,882, and property claims against railroads averaged $5,930.
These figures are derived from a detailed examination of files of tort cases in Fayette County. See

supra note 22.
97. WEsT VIRGINIA DEP'T OF MINES, supra note 44. These prices were computed from the
Annual Reports for the years 1883 through 1925, with the exclusion of the years 1884 to 1887.
98.

For an extraordinary effort to specify the economic assumptions upon which an historical

interpretation of coal industry support for coal mining safety legislation was based see Graebner,
Great Expectations: The Search for Order in Bituminous Coal, 1890-1917, 48 Bus. HiST. REv. 49

(1974).
99. R. LUBOVE, supra note 35, at 51-52. See generally H. SMITH, supra note 83.
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nies were not at all threatened by litigation costs. This suggests that
larger firms were unlikely to have been motivated by the costs of litigation to support workmen's compensation, while smaller firms may have
had a greater financial motive to advocate reform of the common law.
While the precise impact of the cost of litigation on legal reform will
remain unclear, the effect of accidents on business economics and reform
may be more calculable. The steadiness of the accident rate may create a
false impression concerning miners' and mine owners' perceptions of the
risk of accidents. Undoubtedly miners were unlikely to have been comforted by the poor odds of survival. Analogously, mine owners operating
on a very small margin were unlikely to have been comforted by an actuarial view of the risk of a mine disaster. Mine disasters were costly to
both groups because so many fatalities were involved in a single explosion. However, because of the potential loss of property and productivity,
owners also had an economic loss to bear. Some mine owners considered
economic loss to be more important than the loss of human lives."l °
Therefore, as disasters mounted in the early twentieth century, mine
owners most likely had more than a business-as-usual view of their costs.
For example, Justus Collins, the mine owner cited earlier as unconcerned
about the accidents suffered by individual employees and any subsequent
litigation, became highly concerned about explosions after their marked
increase following 1900.11 The same forces which affected miners' and
attorneys' desires to litigate also created a self-interested concern for disaster prevention on the part of mine owners.
Where do these interpretations leave mainstream and revisionist
theories of early twentieth century tort-law reform? The collective problem-solving approach of mainstream theory fails to examine two important questions which were suggested by the litigation in West Virginia.
First, who was motivated to bring about change? Second, who was in a
position to bring it about? An examination of West Virginia's industrial
accident litigation indicated that coal miners did not make mine safety or
workmen's compensation a priority. In addition, West Virginia coal companies had great influence in the state legislature, and thus were in a far
better position than miners to demand enactment of reform legislation. 102
Therefore, more information about workers, coal mine owners, and the
100. See D. CORBIN, supra note 17, at 23-24; W. GRAEBNER, supra note 35, at 156-57; see also
supra note 75.

101.

Letter from J. Collins to A. M. Herndon (Nov. 20, 1911) (Winding Gulf Colliery Company

Papers) (West Virginia University Library, Morgantown, West Virginia), cited in W. GRAEBNER,
supra note 35, at 145 n.15.
102. See generally J. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 196-232.
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impact of litigation on each must be obtained before any conclusions are
drawn concerning their respective roles in the adoption of workmen's
compensation legislation.
Revisionist theory assumes that the common-law system of compensation was costly to employers, and consequently that employers were
willing to support a reform which would guarantee modest levels of compensation to employees. 103 Very little is actually known about which coal
mine owners supported workmen's compensation and why. The West
Virginia data suggest that the average cost of tort litigation was small,
but that the burden may have posed a greater threat to owners of smaller
mines. Does this suggest the conclusion that owners of small mines were
particularly active and influential in tort reform? If owners of smaller
mines were not particularly influential in tort law reform, then the question of which owners supported workmen's compensation and why still
remains unanswered. Further, preference for litigation rather than regulation as a means of resolving claims for accident compensation reflects a
value-the value attached to having the state play a minimal role in the
affairs of business. Many business owners strongly espoused this view,
while others adopted more progressive views on regulation."° Further
examination of the relationship between accident litigation and the support for workmen's compensation may reveal a great deal about how this
value collapsed or changed in the business community.
Finally, this Article suggested another reason for being cautious
about assuming that the interests of coal owners were aligned with progressive opinion on social legislation. I believe that the motives of mine
owners in supporting workmen's compensation legislation remained obscure because the issue was peripheral to the owners' main concernavoiding disaster. As long as accident claims were relatively routinized,
the source of problems of liability lay not in the cost of accident litigation, but ironically in the dynamics of capitalism. Reform may instead
have been motivated by the costs of unpredictable explosions that accompanied high rates of production and new technology. This economic vulnerability was in turn aggravated by competition, and made it difficult
103. There is little agreement among revisionist historians on this point. Compare Wiebe, Business Disunity and the ProgressiveMovement, 1901-1914, 44 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 665 (1958); J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 40-61; G. KOLKO, supra note 35. Each of these historians presents a
different version of an elite theory of influence, identifying particular business leaders who were in

favor of reform.
104. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 35. The theory that resistance to the growth of the bureaucratic state reflected North American political institutions and values, delaying regulation is advanced by S. SKOWRONEK, supra note 1.
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for individual firms to spend money in order to improve safety. Consequently, the costs of doing business, not the costs of litigation, may have
affected employers' support of legislative reform.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article began with the familiar observation that appellate doctrine and legislative policy are not adequate guides to the role played by
trial courts during industrialization. Examining trial court litigation in
West Virginia at the turn of the century confirmed these doubts about
the normative role of appellate doctrine. The social organization of the
relationships between litigants and attorneys, and between litigants and
their peers, are of equal or greater importance than appellate doctrine in
explaining litigation.
This Article examined industrial accident litigation in an attempt to
explain the steady or increasing rate of litigation, despite the barriers created by the common law. This Article also attempted to explain litigation's decline at a point prior to the adoption of workmen's
compensation, when there was still no commensurate change in the law.
Factors such as public perceptions of mine disasters, collective action by
miners, and the beginnings of specialization among plaintiffs' attorneys
in southern West Virginia were evaluated, and their roles in facilitating
decisions to litigate were also examined. While some of these influences
seem to have been strong, little is known about the reasons why particular classes of litigants chose to pursue litigation over other means of dispute resolution. Once conflict resolution was placed in the hands of an
attorney, it appears that the social characteristics of particular litigants
disappeared, since the settlement rate of tort cases was uniformly high
regardless of the characteristics of the plaintiff, defendant, or the type of
accident.
Theories of the relationship between industrialization and law have
predicted that as a result of the breakdown of other, less formal, mechanisms of conflict resolution, litigation rates will rise during periods of
industrialization. 10 5 This hypothesis rests upon assumptions about the
kinds of alternatives available for conflict resolution in preindustrial society, and upon further assumptions of what happens to these alternatives
as the work and the lives of workers change. Industrialization drastically
changed the character of life in rural West Virginia. Yet trends in the
105. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 111 (1960); Grossman & Sarat, Litigation in the FederalCourts: A ComparativePerspective, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 321, 322-25 (1975).
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rate of tort litigation did not follow the pace of industrialization. Litigation was a rare event in the years examined in this Article. At its peak, in
1890, there were only about four tort cases per ten thousand inhabitants.
Our understanding of the role of law and litigation in daily life is still so
incomplete that we do not know whether to be surprised, or not, by this
low rate. Although it is an observation which applies with greater force
to some areas of social life than to others, the small number of cases
underscores the continuing importance of alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution.
Despite its infrequency, I have tried to suggest how industrial accident litigation may have had an important bearing on the adoption of
social legislation such as workmen's compensation. As the revisionist historians recognized, tort litigation was just one aspect of the continuing
social conflict between operators and workers on the one hand, and operators and encroaching state authority on the other. In order to understand the role played by operators in the growth of regulation, it is
necessary to progress beyond the calculation of the economic costs of
accident litigation to a consideration of the values held by many businessmen who opposed the imposition of regulation. In order to understand
the function of legal institutions in the transformation of the social relations between workers and owners, the effects of law and litigation in
other, perhaps functionally equivalent, areas must be considered. These
include the maintenance of company towns, the control of property, the
formation of families and peer organizations, the suppression of individual and collective activity through criminal law enforcement, the establishment and governance of municipalities, the role of institutions of
democratic government, the jury, and the vote.
Annie Jones and Harrison Fox were participants in the evolution of
conflict resolution during this critical transition period in West Virginia.
Circumstances of their lives, known to us only through court records, do
not set them apart from the large and growing working class of their
communities. Yet, the very fact that they brought their conflicts to lawyers, and subsequently to court, sets them apart from their peers. Court
records help achieve a better understanding of their individual cases, but
their motives remain as obscure as those of operators caught between the
destructive effects of competition and their traditional resistance to regulation. In attempting to assess their motives, it would be a mistake to
focus exclusively on the apparent calculus of advantage in litigation created by legal rules and their interpretations by lawyers. The motives for
using courts are linked, rather, to litigants' expectations of the outcome
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and to the values the parties attached to litigation or to other forms of
conflict resolution. As this Article has demonstrated, these expectations
and values may have had little to do with legal rules. In turn, these expectations and values concerning litigation are linked to the history of
class and class conflict in particular communities. Historical research
into the context of decisions to litigate may be difficult, but if the role of
litigation in industrialization is to be understood, it is research which
must be undertaken.

